within which the United States would not tolerate the intervention of other foreign powers. The agreement also granted the American government temporary control over the security of the island, until such time as 'the dangers to the peace and security' of the continent had passed. 5 The application of the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland had a lasting impact on the governance of the island's security. 6 It placed Greenland firmly in the purview of US defense policies and marked the beginning of enduring, direct American involvement on the island, including the establishment of US military bases there. In spite of the significance of this development, there has been relatively little dedicated scholarship examining the factors that led to this extension of the Monroe Doctrine, or exploring the long-term ramifications of this change in policy for the security governance of the North American Arctic. Despite the fact that the decision to designate Greenland as being, for strategic purposes, part of the Americas was essentially a unilateral action by the Roosevelt administration, the extant literature tends not to deal directly with how and why this pivotal foreign policy decision was made by the US government, focusing instead on other diplomatic aspects of the occupation. 7 
The importance of historical perspective
Although the Arctic played an important strategic role in American security policy during both World War II and Cold War, few recent studies on Arctic governance incorporate historical perspectives in their analyses. This lack of historical contextualization has led present-day academics and policymakers to view contemporary issues of Arctic security governance as unprecedented. For example, a 2009 University of Calgary briefing paper noted that 'while the Arctic is important to the United States, the fact has seldom reached the attention of US policymakers and the US public. This is about to change.' 8 Similarly, a Center for New American Security policy brief from December 2014 stated that 'the Arctic is poised to leave its backwater legacy behind and become a prominent player on the world stage.' 9 This tendency to overlook the historical significance of the region, however, is not a recent phenomenon. In spite of the significance of the Arctic during earlier stages of the Cold War, a 1984 review of an edited volume concerning American interests in the Arctic closely mirrors contemporary writings on the subject, 'long relegated to secondary consideration, the Arctic is acquiring an increasingly salient position in United States foreign policy. This heightened importance is clearly seen in the attention currently being focused upon the Arctic region's resources, strategic location, and jurisdictional conflicts.' 10 By continually ignoring American responses to earlier moments of Arctic geopolitical prominence, opportunities for comparative study and evaluation are being missed.
Moreover, with Greenland moving into a new position as a more independent actor on today's world stage, understanding the historical foundations of its current security arrangements and geopolitical orientation is essential. Discussions concerning the United States and the governance of Greenland's security, however, are complicated by the island's colonial past. For much of Greenland's recent history, the Danish government controlled the island's security, trade, and foreign affairs, including arrangements with the United States concerning military bases on the island. 11 Although Greenlanders attained greater political agency following Home Rule in 1979, two major agreements concerning the governance of the island's affairs -the Denmark-United States Agreement for the Defense of Greenland (1941) and the subsequent Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark (1951) -were drafted solely by American and Danish officials, with little or no input from the island's inhabitants. 12 Although Greenland is currently taking steps toward full independence from Denmark, the Danish government remains formally in control of Greenland's security. Yet, the continued physical presence of the US military -in combination with the diplomatic power of the United States in organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -has historically influenced the governance of the island's security and continues to do so today.
Additionally, recent climatic changes and the growing global demand for natural resources are refocusing international attention on the Arctic region. As a result, Greenland is once again playing an increasingly significant role in American foreign policy and security. Any changes to the existing arrangements between Greenland and Denmark will likely impact American strategic interests on the island. This chapter will therefore examine the nature of the Monroe Doctrine and illustrate how the physical and ideological threats to American security posed by World War II led to the Doctrine's extension to Greenland, resulting in both the 1941 Agreement for the Defense of Greenland and the establishment of US military bases on the island. By situating contemporary security concerns within historical context and discussing the initial justification for American involvement in Greenland, this chapter will also provide insight into the present and future governance of Greenland's security.
The Monroe Doctrine
In his annual address to Congress on 2 December 1823, President James Monroe articulated a sentiment felt by many in his government at the time: that the United States would no longer accept the colonization of the Western Hemisphere by European powers. Monroe's comments were issued as the Americas faced renewed imperial threats -to the Pacific Northwest from Russia and to Latin America and the Caribbean from other European powers. The statement of what would become known as the Monroe Doctrine was a political response to both the physical threat that continued European colonization posed to the Western Hemisphere and the ontological threat it posed to the fledgling American political system. Although the United States had limited military and political strength, the President stated that 'the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects of future colonization by any European power.' 13 Monroe also stressed that the United States would resist any attempt on the part of Old World powers to oppress or control countries that had declared their independence in the New World and that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of the European powers to extend their political system in the Western Hemisphere as 'dangerous to our peace and safety'.
14 The Monroe Doctrine, in essence, established a system of reciprocity that limited European involvement in the Americas and American involvement outside of the Western Hemisphere. 15 At the time of President Monroe's statement, the United States was a fraction of its present size. As the young country's economy and geography expanded, however, so did the scope of the Doctrine. 16 Unlike the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, the Monroe Doctrine is an ideological concept rather than a textual document. Its lack of clear definition has resulted in it acquiring a variety of (frequently incoherent) meanings over time. Writing in 1962 on the place of Latin America in the world, Spanish historian, and former Ambassador to the United States, Salvador de Madariaga commented on both the imprecise definition of the Monroe Doctrine and on its popularity with the American public:
I only know two things about the Monroe Doctrine; one is that no American I have met knows what it is; and the other is that no American I have met will consent to having it tampered with . . . I conclude that the Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine but a dogma . . . Not one dogma but two, to wit the dogma of the infallibility of the American President and the dogma of the immaculate conception of American foreign policy. 17 Indeed, over the course of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the Doctrine was repeatedly invoked to justify expanding American economic and military involvement in the Western Hemisphere.
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Early US interest in Greenland
Although the Monroe Doctrine in theory applied to the entire Western Hemisphere, in practice it has almost exclusively been applied to the Caribbean. 19 The definition of the Western Hemisphere as covered by the Monroe Doctrine has historically been a matter of politics, rather than one of geography. The formulation of the Monroe Doctrine's jurisdiction was based largely on security considerations, where American national interests overruled any sensitivity to legal technicalities. 20 Although many American geographers were in agreement that Greenland was part of the Western Hemisphere, it had not formally been considered as such by the State Department. 21 Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Greenland was only intermittently a subject of interest for American officials and military strategists. Secretary of State William Seward investigated the possibility of Greenland's purchase during the American Civil War, 22 while Maurice Francis Egan, American ambassador to Denmark, discussed trading the Philippines for Greenland in 1910. 23 American Arctic explorer Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary also advocated its acquisition in the early twentieth century, noting:
With the rapid shrinking of distances in this age of speed and invention, Greenland may be of crucial importance to us in the future . . . Greenland in our hands may be a valuable piece in our defensive armor. In the hands of hostile interests it could be a serious menace. 24 Peary also surmised that the island had vast undiscovered mineral wealth and predicted Greenland's central role in future military applications. In 1916, he launched a media campaign in an attempt to convince the American government and general public of the island's strategic value. 25 The campaign was in reaction to the recent Danish request for the United States to recognize Denmark's sovereignty over the entirety of Greenland. Peary, who had braved frigid temperatures and traversed thousands of kilometers of frozen tundra in order to claim large swathes of the northern half of the island for the United States, not only lamented the possible loss of his life's work but also feared for the future security of the United States if Greenland was not brought under American control. He was especially concerned about the potential implications of foreign military bases on the island, particularly in light of technological advances in air and sea power that could leave the United States vulnerable to attack in the event of a future conflict. 26 Peary, however, was fighting an uphill battle. The American recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland was a condition of the sale of the Danish West Indies to the United States. 27 The acquisition of the strategically situated islands of St Croix, St Thomas, and St John was central to American economic and security interests, particularly given their proximity to the recently opened Panama Canal. 28 An additional challenge for Peary was that the discussions were taking place in the midst of World War I. At that time, the United States and Denmark were both neutral in the conflict, but the belligerent actions of Germany in the Western Hemisphere were amplifying the perceived urgency of the negotiations. Germany had controversially attempted to draw Mexico into the war against the United States and was waging unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. Many saw these acts as provocations of war, which increased American desires to secure as much of the hemisphere as possible. In addition, unlike Spain, France, and Britain, Germany did not already possess a colony in the Caribbean. 29 There were growing concerns that Germany would attempt to garner a permanent foothold in the region by establishing a submarine base in St Thomas. 30 Germany's willingness to involve itself in strategic areas of the Western Hemisphere was thus especially problematic in light of the Monroe Doctrine. In Congress, leading Republican senators such as Henry Cabot Lodge were vocal in their support of the purchase of the islands in order to prevent any extension of German influence to St Thomas. 31 The German actions, in combination with the obvious potential advantages of an additional American territory close to the Panama Canal, made the strategic and commercial benefits of the purchase of the Danish West Indies evident. 32 Peary argued that Greenland, like St Thomas, should be covered by the Monroe Doctrine, and the abdication of American claims to the island was in violation of the principles of the Doctrine. Despite Peary's protests, however, the value of retaining claims to Greenland was less clear to either the average American citizen or politician. In addition to the lack of public support for its acquisition, Greenland continued to present practical problems of access. The island's unpredictable weather, heavy fogs, and pack ice made it extremely difficult to reach by sea for a large part of the year. Although Peary lauded the island's potential value for transatlantic air routes to Europe, aviation in the Arctic remained untested and was seen as extremely dangerous. In the end, American policymakers decided to prioritize the tangible and immediate need to secure the Panama Canal over Greenland's future potential. 33 The sale of the Danish West Indies to the United States was approved in 1916 and the islands were officially transferred on 31 March 1917. 34 Once the USD 25 million deal was ratified by the Senate and the House, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, issued a statement that declared, 'the government of the United States of America will not object to the Danish government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland'. 35 In the years following World War I, however, technology progressed rapidly. In less than two decades, Peary's vision of Greenland's central role in American security policy was realized. By the early 1940s, several technological and political factors converged to make the island one of the most geopolitically significant locations in the Western Hemisphere.
Greenland becomes strategic -and 'American'
During World War II, the physical and ideological threats posed by foreign wars and totalitarian regimes prompted a geographical expansion of the Monroe Doctrine to include the eastern North American Arctic. The extension of the Doctrine, which continued to be defined primarily in terms of 'self-defense', was based on political rather than geographic considerations. 36 While Greenland's geography remained static, a series of interconnected technological, political, and military factors prompted a change in the US government's perspective on Greenland and the eventual application of the Monroe Doctrine there. To be sure, as late as 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull's own officials advised against entering negotiations to purchase Greenland. 37 Harry Hines Woodring, American Secretary of War, said that the island was too far from 'any practicable sea or air routes of the United States' to justify its acquisition. 38 In less than a year, however, Germany invaded Denmark, and Greenland quickly went from being too remote to being a vital component of North American security strategy under the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine had never been previously applied to any of the European colonies in the North Atlantic, and its potential application to Greenland required the State Department to reconsider the position of the island in relation to the United States. Some of the most significant changes to military strategy in the interwar period related to technological developments in aviation. Airpower had improved significantly in the 1930s, in terms of both range and carrying capacity, and aviation was changing the strategic thinking of the military. 39 In military strategy, the objective of an offensive attack was to gain control of an area while that of a defensive attack was to maintain control of an area. Historically, land areas had been controlled by armies and sea areas had been controlled by navies. Airpower, by contrast, had to be considered in terms of all three areas: land, sea, and air. 40 The potential for aircraft to contribute to three dimensions of combat led to calls to replace entire naval fleets with airplanes. Airpower, however, was still in the nascent stages of development, and aircraft were limited by their materials, flying conditions, and their range. During the interwar period, Greenland played a role in advances in all three areas.
First, Greenland was home to cryolite, a mineral that was unique to the island and essential to the aluminum smelting process. One of the major restrictions of early aircraft was their weight: the lighter a plane, the farther it could fly. Aluminum was light, flexible, and strong, and it rapidly became the preferred material for the construction of airplanes. By 1940, the average plane was composed of 75 percent aluminum. Aluminum became so essential to war-time manufacturing that in the early stages of the war, there were shortages of the material despite the doubling of global production. 41 In the 1940s, there were a number of methods available to produce aluminum, but to do so in the most cost-effective manner required access to two essential materials: bauxite and cryolite. 42 In the HallHéroult process of aluminum production, bauxite, an aluminum ore that is a composite sedimentary rock, is heated and filtered to produce aluminum oxide. The aluminum oxide is then heated and cryolite is added as a flux and charged with an electric current to produce the metal. 43 While bauxite is one of the most abundant materials on earth and was mined on nearly every continent, cryolite, by contrast, was only found in commercially exploitable quantities in Ivigtut, Greenland. The mine was 200 meters below sea level with open-pit operations that made it not only strategically valuable but also vulnerable to potential sabotage. 44 The possible disruption of the North American cryolite supply led to calls from industry for the island, and its resources, to be protected. 45 Second, Greenland played an important role in both the development and refinement of meteorological science. The confirmation of the Scandinavian Polar Front Theory in the interwar period established Greenland as one of the most reliable locations from which to predict weather patterns in Europe, which was vital to successful aviation. 46 Accurate meteorological data was important for all branches of the military. The Army needed precise weather details for troop movements, as it is, for example, much more difficult to make progress over large land areas in a violent rain or snowstorm. The Navy relied on accurate weather reports for safe sailing, and in northern waters for the prediction and detection of icebergs. 47 Finally, the Air Force was reliant on knowledge of the weather in order to function. Although significantly more technologically advanced than in World War I, aircraft still lacked instrumentation to assist with conditions of low visibility. Fogs and snow storms were especially precarious for landings because pilots remained largely dependent on their sight for successful landings. Weather was also important for larger military strategies and coordinated attacks. With accurate weather reports, even bad weather could be made advantageous. 48 In order to fully exploit the advantages afforded by good meteorological information, it was essential to understand how weather patterns functioned to have means accurately to measure weather in a location and to possess a method to convey and receive that information that was faster than the weather itself. Developments and improvements in all three of these areas occurred in Greenland in the interwar period and contributed to the increased geopolitical significance of the island on the eve of war.
In addition to its role in aluminum production and meteorological prediction, Greenland, situated on flight paths between North America and Europe, was poised to play a significant role as a refuelling point on transpolar air routes. Polar projection maps, which had the North Pole at their centre, illustrated why the Arctic was expected to become 'the great transportation crossroads of the world'. 49 The concept of trans-Arctic aviation had been around for several decades, but only began to be realized as a result of technological advances in aviation and meteorology in the years directly preceding World War II. 50 As mentioned, in spite of the recent developments, aircraft continued to be limited by their range, and few planes in the 1930s had the ability to make a transatlantic crossing without refuelling. Flight paths over the Arctic had the potential to significantly reduce international flight times and distances, but Arctic flying continued to be seen as extremely dangerous. Engines were not suitably reliable and, as mentioned, aircraft were vulnerable to fluctuations in weather conditions. Although the first exhibition flights from the United States to Greenland occurred in the early interwar period, concerns persisted about the viability of landing on Greenland's polar icecap, and navigating aircraft in the long Arctic nights. 51 These fears, however, were allayed, somewhat inadvertently, in a short period of time during Arctic airman Hubert Wilkins' search for another missing Arctic explorer, Russian pilot Sigismund Levanevsky. Wilkins flew an unprecedented 20,000 miles over the Polar Sea in the autumn and winter of 1937-38. Some of his flights were over 3,000 miles long and many were conducted in the winter season without daylight. Over the course of his searches, Wilkins made a number of landings previously thought impossible. 52 Although unsuccessful in locating Levanevsky, Wilkins' search had the unintended consequence of proving that any camp located anywhere on the drifting pack ice could be reached by airplane at any time of year. The work of Wilkins and of other polar aviators in the interwar period also confirmed the relative facility of access to the continental United States from Greenland. This development, in the context of war, generated an American security concern and an impetus for renewed interest in the geography of the Monroe Doctrine.
By the early twentieth century, the various permutations of the Monroe Doctrine used to justify American interventions had seriously damaged its reputation among both Latin American and Caribbean countries, and in American diplomatic circles. 53 Less than four years prior the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Key Pittman, declared the Monroe Doctrine dead in a public interview. 54 In spite of the bleak diplomatic perception of the Doctrine, both abroad and at home, the American public remained very supportive of it. The Doctrine's chameleon-like nature meant that it could be used to support both interventionist and isolationist foreign policies in the name of hemispheric security. When Franklin Roosevelt entered office, the 'Monroe Doctrine was the most firmly established and most popular of the foreign policies of the United States, and its obligations were taken as seriously by the man in the street as by the high official of government'. 55 The early years of Roosevelt's presidency were plagued by severe economic depression and an increasingly unstable international situation.
As the international security crises intensified, the ideals espoused in the Monroe Doctrine took on a renewed significance. Adolf Hitler's drive for German expansion into neighboring European countries posed a threat to Western Hemispheric security. Many of Germany's potential targets had colonies in the New World, and the invasion of countries on the European mainland would necessarily have repercussions in their colonies in the Western Hemisphere: the Dutch-owned Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, and Dutch Guiana; the French possessed St Pierre, Miquelon, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana; British colonies in the hemisphere included Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, British Honduras, British Guiana, and several islands in the Lesser Antilles. Although Canada was a Dominion of the United Kingdom, rather than a colony, many continued to see it as an extension of Great Britain. In addition, the United States had purchased the Danish West Indies from Denmark during World War I, but Greenland, the world's largest non-continental island, remained a Danish colony.
Roosevelt understood that the United States would not be able to defend the entire hemisphere on its own and made moves to significantly change the nature and scope of the Monroe Doctrine. Although the Doctrine remained first and foremost one of American self-defense, Roosevelt sought to rebrand the Doctrine as part of his Good Neighbor Policy and make it a multilateral, rather than a unilateral, policy. 56 Through a series of Latin American conferences, Roosevelt attempted to transform the Monroe Doctrine into 'a pan-American doctrine of selfdefense' that compelled all American states included in the conferences to ensure the safety of one another. 57 In addition to reimagining the nature of the Doctrine, in 1938, Roosevelt also expanded its scope by including Canada under its principles during a speech at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. 58 His action was characterized as 'one of the most striking developments' in the recent history of the Doctrine. 59 These political developments nonetheless had few tangible effects for the Arctic. It was not until the declarations of war in September of 1939 that the American government was forced to reconsider territories in the peripheries of the hemisphere like Greenland. The potential German occupation of European colonial holdings in the Western Hemisphere took on greater significance as a result of the advances in aviation in the interwar period, which put many of them within striking distance of the continental United States.
American concerns regarding Germany establishing a presence on Greenland were not unfounded. Germany had a long-standing military interest in Greenland for the acquisition of meteorological data. 60 German scientists conducted numerous studies on the island in the 1930s and had developed plans to establish meteorological stations for tactical purposes on the island in the event of an occupation of Denmark. 61 The German invasion of Demark on 9 April 1940 made the theoretical challenges to American security a reality and provided the final impetus for the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland. In an instant, the ideological questions relating to potential German seizure of European colonial holdings in the Western Hemisphere, as well as the practical concerns relating to access of the island and its resources, were made tangible when German troops crossed the Danish border.
The invasion greatly increased the possibility of a foreign occupation of Greenland, not only from Germany which now had a strong legal claim to the island but also from Britain and Canada. Both countries were interested in Greenland as a result of the island's proximity to Canadian shores and North Atlantic convoy routes, and its deposits of cryolite for the Canadian aluminum industry. 62 Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs that when Germany invaded Denmark, immediately his 'associates in the State Department brought [him] maps showing that Greenland was wholly, and Iceland largely in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore the islands fell within the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine.' 63 Although the United States had only limited previous interest in Greenland, the American government was eager to prevent any new foreign involvement on the island. The possibility of a change in stewardship of a territory in the Western Hemisphere was seen as unacceptable by both Roosevelt and Cordell Hull in the State Department. These concerns were further compounded by the increasingly real possibility of an attack on the United States launched from the island. If Greenland was considered part of North America, and by extension part of the Western Hemisphere, then the Monroe Doctrine would apply to it, but the concept of the Monroe Doctrine itself was in transition.
The tenuous state of global geopolitics not only exacerbated the US government's security concerns but also necessitated caution with the articulation of American policies both domestically and abroad. Within the United States there was strong public and congressional opposition to any policies that could be interpreted as moving the United States into war. Internationally, in addition to the German, British, and Canadian interest in Greenland, the Japanese were also watching the situation closely in the hopes that it could be used as a precedent to justify the seizure of the Dutch East Indies in the event of a German invasion of the Netherlands. 64 The State Department was also concerned about the perception of the Latin American states if the United States were to act unilaterally with respect to Greenland.
These mitigating external factors made Roosevelt reluctant to publicly formalize the American view on Greenland without sufficient domestic and international support, which would subsequently take approximately a year. This support, however, did not include the opinions of either the island's indigenous or Danish inhabitants to whom American plans for the island accorded only marginal consideration. Although the cultural, religious, and humanitarian concerns of Greenlanders were invoked to justify and reinforce the political decisions that were made with respect to the island, they were not in and of themselves determining factors in the shift in American policy. The State Department made a token effort to work with the United Greenland Council, but eventually finalized the Defense Agreement with the Danish ambassador to the United States. The resulting agreement was the basis for the completion of several bases and meteorological stations on the island during the war, including Sondrestrom Air Base (originally Bluie West-8). 65 In the discussions surrounding the creation of NATO, it was noted that 'Greenland and Iceland were more important than some countries in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada.' 66 In 1951, the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark signed a formal agreement for the defense of Greenland. It granted the US military exclusive jurisdiction over existing bases at Narsarsuaq, on the island's southern coast, and the centrally located Sonderstrom Air Base. It also enabled the United States to begin construction of the Thule base on the island's northwest coast, which played a vital role in continental defense during the Cold War.
Although the United States later decommissioned the Narsarsuaq and Sonderstrom bases, Thule continues to serve as a 'vital link in Western and NATO defenses'. 67 In 2004, the Danish government, in conjunction with the Greenlandic Home Rule government, signed further agreements which allowed for the early warning radar system at Thule (which supports the US missile defense system) to be upgraded. The agreements also 'created new opportunities for both sides to enhance economic, technical, and environmental cooperation between the United States and Greenland'. 68 Greenland's transition to full independence from Denmark would necessitate the renegotiation of existing agreements, giving rise to both opportunities and challenges for the future governance of Greenland's security.
Conclusion
In the midst of World War II, the German invasion of Denmark provided a catalyst for American intervention in Greenland and the creation of US military bases on the island. Today, as the Arctic warms at a rate nearly double the rest of the planet, it may not be armed conflict, but the environment, that presents the greatest security threat to the region.
Parallels can be drawn between the ways in which technological advances in the interwar period facilitated trans-polar aviation, and how the effects of climate change are facilitating access to previously unnavigable northern sea routes today. These developments are once again increasing the geopolitical significance of the Arctic, attracting the attentions of new international economic and political powers, and forcing the United States to reconsider its role in Arctic security governance. The 2013 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region notes that the 'remote and complex operating conditions in the Arctic environment make the region well suited for collaborative efforts'. 69 The first guiding principle identified in the strategy is to safeguard the peace and stability of the region as an area free from conflict, acting in conjunction with allies, partners, and other interested parties to support and preserve navigation, lawful commerce, and 'the peaceful resolution of disputes for all nations'. 70 In a speech to the Organization of American States in late November of 2013, American Secretary of State John Kerry declared that after 190 years the 'era of the Monroe Doctrine is over'. 71 Kerry asserted that the relationship that the United States sought with other American states was not about when to intervene in the hemisphere, but about 'viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, cooperating on security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to the decisions that we make as partners to advance the values and interests we share'. 72 In spite of his public renunciation of the Doctrine, the Secretary of State's vision for inter-American relations closely mirror the multilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine articulated during Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. In an era of global economic crisis and waning American geopolitical prominence, political rhetoric alone is no longer sufficient to buttress American security interests in the hemisphere -especially in the North American Arctic. The rapid retreat of Greenland's ice sheet will have global consequences and will require multi-lateral solutions to mitigate.
